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Rational	  Evaluability	  and	  Perceptual	  Farce*	  Afterword	  to	  Cognitive	  Effects	  on	  Perception:	  New	  Philosophical	  Perspectives.	  	  	  Eds.	  J.	  Zeimbekis	  and	  A.	  Raftopoulos.	  	  Susanna	  Siegel	  	  	  Several	  contributors	  in	  this	  volume	  observe	  that	  each	  part	  of	  the	  notion	  ‘cognitive	  penetration	  of	  perception’	  can	  be	  specified	  in	  multiple	  ways.1	  The	  first	  parameter	  concerns	  the	  kind	  of	  perception	  at	  issue:	  is	  it	  early	  vision,	  or	  only	  those	  parts	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  produced	  by	  early	  vision,	  or	  all	  perceptual	  experience,	  or	  perceptual	  judgment	  downstream	  of	  experience,	  or	  any	  perceptual	  state	  or	  event,	  or	  the	  entire	  perceptual	  system?	  The	  second	  parameter	  concerns	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  cognitive	  influence:	  in	  addition	  to	  belief,	  suspicions,	  desires,	  and	  fears,	  do	  such	  influencers	  include	  affect,	  imagination,	  attention,	  sensory-­‐motor	  dispositions,	  any	  information	  learned	  through	  patterns	  of	  exposure,	  or	  stored	  assumptions	  used	  in	  perceptual	  inference?	  Is	  ‘cognitive’	  a	  placeholder	  for	  ‘psychological’,	  or	  does	  it	  mark	  a	  distinction	  in	  the	  mind	  between	  cognition	  and	  perception?	  The	  third	  parameter	  is	  the	  relationship	  that	  characterizes	  the	  influence:	  is	  it	  merely	  causal?	  is	  it	  semantically	  relevant?	  does	  it	  include	  associations	  between	  properties	  that	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  influencer	  and	  by	  the	  perceptual	  state?	  	  	  Taken	  together,	  the	  papers	  in	  this	  volume	  make	  the	  case	  for	  a	  family	  of	  phenomena	  that	  differ	  depending	  on	  how	  each	  of	  these	  parameters	  is	  fixed.	  Most	  contributors	  focus	  on	  whether	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  mind	  allows	  influences	  on	  perception	  that	  are	  defined	  by	  setting	  the	  parameters	  listed	  above.2	  Many	  offer	  arguments	  with	  a	  deflationary	  flavor:	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  only	  superficially	  similar	  to	  “properly”	  cognitive	  penetration	  has	  been	  mistaken	  for	  it,3	  or	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  superficially	  similar	  to	  properly	  cognitive	  penetration	  doesn’t	  share	  the	  epistemically	  interesting	  upshots	  that	  properly	  cognitive	  penetration	  is	  supposed	  to	  have.4	  Nearly	  all	  of	  these	  contributors	  assume	  an	  architecturally	  significant	  distinction	  between	  perception	  and	  cognition,	  relative	  to	  which	  the	  influence	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  they	  call	  attention	  to	  do	  not	  count	  as	  cognitive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  For	  comments	  and	  discussion,	  thanks	  to	  Ned	  Block,	  Alex	  Byrne,	  Jeremy	  Dolan,	  Eric	  Mandelbaum,	  Farid	  Masrour,	  and	  especially	  Zoe	  Jenkin.	  1	  See	  the	  contributions	  by	  Deroy,	  Machery,	  Macpherson,	  Mole,	  and	  Stokes.	  2	  See	  the	  contributions	  by	  Briscoe,	  Burnston	  and	  Cohen,	  DeRoy,	  Dokic	  and	  Martin,	  Dretske,	  Machery,	  Macpherson,	  Mole,	  Wu	  and	  Mahon,	  Raftopoulos,	  and	  Pagondiotis,	  as	  well	  as	  Macpherson	  (2012).	  3	  Deroy,	  Dokic	  and	  Martin,	  Machery,	  and	  Raftopoulos.	  4	  See	  the	  contributions	  by	  Briscoe,	  Lowe,	  Pagondiotis,	  and	  Zeimbekis.	  From	  the	  opposite	  end,	  Mole’s	  conclusion	  is	  inflationary:	  attention-­‐mediated	  influences	  on	  perception	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  definitions	  of	  cognitive	  penetration,	  when	  in	  fact	  they	  should	  be	  included.	  And	  Lyons	  argues	  from	  a	  reliabilist	  perspective	  that	  the	  same	  negative	  epistemic	  upshot	  can	  apply	  to	  both	  cognitive	  penetration	  and	  mere	  influence	  on	  judgment.	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  Given	  these	  pluralities,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  phenomenon	  of	  cognitive	  penetration.	  There	  is	  therefore	  no	  single	  version	  of	  the	  existence	  question:	  “Is	  there	  cognitive	  penetration?”,	  or	  the	  classification	  question:	  “Is	  this	  experimental	  result	  evidence	  of	  cognitive	  penetration?”,	  or	  the	  epistemic	  question:	  “Does	  cognitive	  penetration	  have	  philosophically	  important	  epistemic	  consequences?”.	  	  	   In	  response	  to	  the	  plurality	  of	  phenomena,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  postpone	  the	  existence	  and	  classification	  questions	  until	  one	  or	  another	  theoretical	  purpose	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  has	  been	  specified.	  If	  the	  theoretical	  purpose	  concerns	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  mind,	  we	  can	  ask:	  could	  we	  learn	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  has	  or	  lacks	  architecture	  X,	  if	  we	  learned	  that	  phenomenon	  Y	  did	  or	  didn’t	  occur	  in	  our	  minds?	  This	  question	  could	  guide	  one	  in	  selecting	  phenomenon	  Y	  to	  use	  in	  formulating	  corresponding	  existence,	  classification,	  and	  epistemic	  questions.	  Stokes	  advocates	  this	  general	  ‘consequentialist’	  approach,	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  singling	  out	  a	  unique	  phenomenon	  for	  us	  to	  attach	  to	  the	  label	  ‘cognitive	  penetration’.5	  But	  nothing	  precludes	  us	  from	  using	  this	  approach	  multiple	  times,	  to	  yield	  multiple	  existence,	  classification,	  and	  epistemic	  questions.	  	  	  	  	  A	  different	  response	  to	  the	  plurality	  starts	  directly	  with	  epistemically	  significant	  or	  epistemically	  interesting	  phenomena,	  and	  considers	  which	  psychological	  structures	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  them,	  without	  trying	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  those	  structures,	  if	  any,	  exemplify	  cognitive	  penetration.	  This	  approach	  skips	  the	  existence,	  classification,	  and	  epistemic	  questions,	  and	  avoids	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  perception	  and	  cognition.	  There	  need	  not	  be	  any	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  that	  is	  defined	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  some	  instances	  of	  it	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  epistemic	  implications	  of	  interest.	  	  	  I’ll	  apply	  this	  second	  approach	  to	  two	  sets	  of	  epistemic	  phenomena.	  First,	  I	  consider	  which	  psychological	  precursors	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  impact	  its	  power	  to	  provide	  rational	  support	  certain	  other	  propositions.	  Many	  contributors	  mention	  a	  
negative	  epistemic	  upshot	  that	  they	  assume	  cognitive	  penetration	  could	  generate,	  and	  take	  this	  negative	  upshot	  to	  be	  the	  main	  thing	  at	  stake	  in	  whether	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  mind	  allows	  it.6	  I	  make	  the	  case	  that	  this	  attitude	  may	  tie	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Stokes,	  this	  volume.	  6	  Zeimbekis	  mentions	  “epistemically	  pernicious	  consequences	  usually	  expected	  of	  cognitive	  penetration”	  to	  which	  the	  effects	  he	  focuses	  on	  are	  immune.	  Dockic	  and	  Martin	  likewise	  focus	  on	  “suspect	  that	  the	  epistemological	  consequences	  of	  the	  cognitive	  penetrability	  of	  feelings	  would	  be	  very	  different	  from,	  and	  much	  less	  disastrous	  than,	  the	  epistemological	  consequences	  of	  the	  cognitive	  penetration	  of	  perceptual	  content	  itself.”	  Machery	  writes:	  “philosophers	  are	  largely	  concerned	  with	  the	  cognitive	  penetrability	  hypothesis	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  deprive	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  its	  distinctive	  role	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  beliefs.	  But,	  since	  it	  is	  dubious	  that	  degraded	  and	  ambiguous	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  any	  such	  role,	  the	  influence	  of	  beliefs,	  desires,	  emotions,	  etc.,	  on	  this	  kind	  of	  experience	  is	  of	  little	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architectural	  and	  the	  epistemic	  questions	  together	  too	  tightly,	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  negative	  upshot	  is	  only	  one	  interesting	  upshot	  among	  many	  that	  psychological	  influences	  might	  have	  on	  perceptual	  experience.	  Second,	  I	  identify	  an	  even	  wider	  family	  of	  phenomena	  that	  I	  call	  “perceptual	  farce”	  to	  help	  us	  consider	  how	  psychological	  precursors	  could	  impact	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  reflecting	  and	  sometimes	  masking	  social	  forces.	  	  I	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  epistemic	  phenomena	  below.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  Rational	  Evaluability	  of	  Perceptual	  Experience	  	  	  Suppose	  you	  see	  Jack	  walking	  toward	  you.	  Seeing	  his	  face	  can	  give	  you	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  he	  is	  angry.	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  your	  visual	  experience	  in	  giving	  you	  reason	  to	  form	  this	  belief	  about	  Jack?	  	  	  Many	  philosophers	  hold	  that	  your	  visual	  experience	  purports	  to	  represent	  features	  of	  Jack	  and	  his	  face,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  your	  experience	  would	  be	  inaccurate	  if	  things	  in	  the	  external	  world	  weren’t	  the	  way	  your	  experience	  presented	  them	  as	  being.	  In	  presenting	  you	  with	  Jack	  and	  his	  facial	  expression,	  your	  experience	  identifies	  something	  that	  might	  be	  reasonable	  for	  you	  to	  believe:	  for	  instance,	  ‘He	  is	  angry’.	  A	  natural	  next	  idea	  is	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  you	  can	  have	  reason	  from	  your	  experience	  to	  believe	  what	  your	  experience	  suggests	  to	  you.	  	  	  In	  the	  history	  of	  analytic	  philosophy,	  both	  this	  construal	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  its	  power	  to	  give	  you	  reason	  to	  believe	  what	  it	  suggests	  are	  relatively	  new.	  Davidson	  famously	  held	  that	  only	  a	  belief	  can	  justify	  another	  belief.	  Quine	  didn’t	  talk	  about	  perceptual	  experience	  at	  all	  in	  discussing	  belief	  formation	  –	  only	  about	  ‘sensory	  stimulation’.7	  Classical	  foundationalists	  shared	  Quine’s	  (and	  perhaps	  Davidson’s)	  impoverished	  construal	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  on	  which	  they	  did	  not	  purport	  to	  represent	  conditions	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  and	  took	  the	  main	  challenge	  for	  epistemology	  to	  be	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  transition	  from	  introspective	  beliefs	  self-­‐ascribing	  such	  impoverished	  ‘sensory	  inputs’	  to	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  could	  be	  rational.	  	  	   Despite	  their	  differences,	  both	  older	  and	  newer	  construals	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  its	  epistemic	  role	  agree	  that	  experiences	  (variously	  called	  ‘sense-­‐data’,	  ‘havings	  of	  sense-­‐data’,	  ‘conscious	  sensory	  inputs’,	  ‘percepts’,	  or	  ‘perceptual	  experiences’)	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  states	  that	  cannot	  be	  formed	  rationally	  or	  irrationally,	  relative	  to	  the	  same	  epistemic	  norms	  that	  we	  apply	  to	  beliefs	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  whether	  they	  are	  epistemically	  well-­‐formed	  or	  epistemically	  badly-­‐formed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  philosophical	  relevance.”	  Lowe	  and	  Pagondiotis	  focus	  on	  putative	  threats	  to	  realism	  from	  cognitive	  penetrability.	  	  7	  Davidson	  (1986).	  Quine	  (1960)	  also	  worked	  with	  notions	  of	  experience,	  observation,	  and	  
evidence	  that	  were	  much	  less	  impoverished,	  but	  never	  assimilated	  sensory	  stimulation	  to	  any	  of	  these.	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Davidson,	  Quine,	  and	  the	  classical	  foundationalists	  would	  all	  agree	  with	  their	  contemporary	  detractors	  that	  we	  can’t	  reason	  our	  way	  to	  experiences,	  the	  way	  we	  can	  reason	  our	  way	  to	  belief.	  A	  fortiori,	  we	  can’t	  reason	  our	  way	  well	  to	  experiences,	  nor	  can	  we	  reason	  our	  way	  to	  them	  epistemically	  badly.	  	   The	  standard	  examples	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  call	  this	  assumption	  into	  question,	  even	  when	  those	  examples	  are	  fictional.	  Several	  contributors	  discuss	  the	  case	  of	  Jack	  and	  Jill:	  Jack	  believes	  Jill	  is	  angry	  at	  him,	  and	  his	  belief	  helps	  explain	  why,	  when	  he	  sees	  Jill,	  her	  face	  looks	  angry	  to	  him.	  If	  you	  saw	  Jill’s	  face,	  you’d	  see	  her	  neutral	  expression	  for	  what	  it	  is.	  Jack	  is	  having	  an	  illusion	  brought	  on	  by	  his	  belief.	  Now	  consider	  whether	  his	  visual	  experience	  of	  Jill’s	  face	  as	  angry	  provides	  him	  with	  additional	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  she	  is	  angry.	  Normally,	  when	  you	  look	  at	  someone,	  you	  can	  gain	  evidence	  from	  how	  they	  look	  about	  their	  mood.	  If	  Jack	  can’t	  do	  that	  in	  this	  case,	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  his	  belief	  on	  his	  experience,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  his	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  reduced	  by	  one	  of	  its	  causes.	  	  	  	   A	  second	  fictional	  example	  is	  an	  oversimplified	  form	  of	  influence	  on	  color	  experience	  by	  ‘memory	  color’.	  A	  grey	  banana	  looks	  yellow,	  due	  to	  your	  belief	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow.8	  That	  belief	  prevents	  you	  from	  seeing	  the	  greyness	  of	  the	  banana	  for	  what	  it	  is,	  just	  as	  Jack’s	  belief	  prevents	  him	  from	  seeing	  Jill’s	  neutral	  expression	  for	  what	  it	  is.	  We	  can	  then	  ask	  whether	  your	  yellow-­‐banana	  experience	  provides	  as	  much	  rational	  support	  as	  it	  might	  otherwise	  do	  for	  believing	  that	  	  (i) the	  banana	  you	  see	  is	  yellow,	  	  or	  for	  increasing	  your	  confidence	  in	  the	  generalization	  that	  	  (ii) bananas	  are	  yellow.	  	  Here	  too,	  many	  contributors	  assume	  that	  if	  memory	  color	  operated	  through	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  belief	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow	  on	  color	  experience,	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  color	  experience	  would	  be	  reduced	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  or	  both	  of	  these	  propositions.	  	  The	  epistemological	  assumptions	  listed	  so	  far	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  perceptual	  experiences	  to	  support	  beliefs	  that	  helped	  produce	  the	  experiences.	  But	  parallel	  questions	  arise	  for	  fears	  and	  desires.	  Would	  Jack’s	  fear	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  central	  experimental	  papers	  are	  Hansen	  (2006),	  Olkkonen	  (2008),	  Witzel	  (2011).	  	  It	  is	  in	  dispute	  whether	  the	  influencing	  state	  is	  a	  belief,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  its	  content	  is	  (“Bananas	  are	  yellow”	  or	  “Banana-­‐shaped	  and	  textured	  things	  are	  yellow”.)	  The	  example	  in	  the	  text	  is	  fictional	  because	  it	  stipulates	  both	  that	  the	  influencing	  state	  is	  a	  belief,	  and	  that	  the	  subject	  experiences	  the	  banana	  as	  yellow,	  whereas	  in	  the	  real	  case	  it	  is	  experienced	  as	  yellowish	  (though	  see	  Zeimbekis	  2013	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  is	  simply	  experienced	  as	  gray,	  with	  no	  effect	  on	  color	  experience	  at	  all.	  The	  phenomenon	  is	  also	  discussed	  by	  Brogaard	  and	  Gatzia	  (ms)	  and	  Macpherson	  (2012).)	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Jill	  is	  angry	  be	  confirmed	  by	  experiencing	  her	  as	  angry,	  if	  his	  fear	  helped	  produce	  her	  experience?	  If	  you	  hoped	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow	  and	  this	  hope	  generated	  a	  yellow	  experience	  upon	  seeing	  a	  grey	  banana,	  would	  that	  influence	  detract	  from	  the	  experience’s	  rational	  power	  to	  support	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  banana	  is	  yellow,	  or	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow?	  	  	   These	  questions	  probe	  whether	  experiences	  can	  lose	  any	  of	  their	  rational	  power	  by	  virtue	  of	  influences	  from	  doxastic	  states,	  conative	  states,	  or	  fear.	  If	  they	  can,	  then	  the	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  itself	  rationally	  evaluable,	  in	  the	  following	  sense:	  it	  depends	  for	  its	  formation	  on	  other	  psychological	  states,	  and	  that	  dependence	  impacts	  its	  power	  to	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  other	  propositions.	  (I	  return	  shortly	  to	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  experience	  may	  be	  impacted).	  	   None	  of	  the	  contributors	  contest	  the	  substantive	  epistemological	  thesis	  that	  the	  experiences	  in	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  scenarios	  would	  lose	  some	  (or	  all)	  of	  their	  rational	  support	  they	  could	  otherwise	  offer	  for	  certain	  propositions.9	  But	  many	  have	  epistemologically	  deflationary	  aims	  of	  a	  different	  sort.	  They	  assume	  that	  cognitive	  penetration	  has	  epistemic	  effects	  like	  these,	  and	  then	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  experimental	  data	  most	  often	  put	  forward	  as	  examples	  of	  cognitive	  penetrability	  are	  at	  best	  evidence	  of	  “lateral”	  or	  “intra-­‐perceptual”	  effects,	  effects	  mediated	  by	  attention	  or	  affect,	  or	  simply	  effects	  on	  perceptual	  judgment,	  where	  this	  is	  downstream	  from	  perceptual	  experience.10	  Memory	  color,	  multisensory	  integration,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  contributors	  don’t	  contest	  this,	  but	  it	  is	  contested	  by	  Huemer	  2013,	  Tucker	  2014,	  Fumerton	  (2013),	  Pryor	  2001,	  among	  others,	  and	  defended	  by	  Jenkin	  (ms),	  Lyons	  (2013),	  McGrath	  (2013,	  2014),	  Siegel	  (2012,	  2013a),	  Teng	  (ms),	  and	  Vance	  (2013).	  Even	  those	  who	  deny	  that	  cognitive	  penetration	  by	  itself	  could	  reduce	  the	  epistemic	  power	  of	  experience	  agree	  that	  if	  the	  subject	  learned	  that	  her	  experience	  had	  been	  produced	  in	  those	  ways,	  she	  would	  have	  a	  defeater	  the	  undercut	  the	  experience	  as	  a	  source	  of	  rational	  support.	  The	  issue	  is	  whether	  any	  psychological	  influences	  on	  perception	  by	  themselves,	  absent	  awareness	  of	  them,	  could	  have	  this	  effect.	  10	  See	  the	  contributions	  by	  Briscoe,	  Machery,	  DeRoy,	  Dokic	  and	  Martin,	  and	  Zeimbekis,	  as	  well	  as	  Zeimbekis	  (2013),	  Brogaard	  and	  Gatzia	  (ms).	  Following	  DeRoy	  (2011),	  many	  of	  these	  writers	  classify	  the	  stored	  generalization	  in	  the	  case	  of	  memory	  color	  as	  perceptual	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  measurable	  effect	  is	  weaker	  for	  line	  drawings	  and	  stronger	  for	  realistic	  pictures.	  A	  banana	  will	  continue	  to	  look	  yellowish	  even	  after	  its	  hue	  is	  adjusted	  far	  past	  grey,	  but	  a	  line	  drawing	  of	  a	  banana	  will	  not	  be	  adjusted	  as	  far	  past	  grey	  as	  a	  realistic	  picture	  of	  a	  banana.	  Categorizing	  the	  item	  as	  a	  banana	  thus	  seems	  not	  to	  determine	  how	  strong	  the	  effect	  is,	  since	  the	  perceiver	  recognizes	  the	  item	  as	  a	  banana	  both	  times.	  The	  difference	  in	  strength	  of	  effect	  seems	  to	  come	  from	  factors	  that	  differ	  between	  the	  line	  drawing	  and	  the	  realistic	  picture,	  such	  as	  texture	  and	  shape	  information.	  But	  which	  properties	  a	  state	  represents	  does	  not	  settle	  whether	  the	  state	  itself	  belongs	  to	  perception	  or	  to	  belief	  (cognition).	  We	  know	  and	  hence	  believe	  that	  banana-­‐shaped	  and	  textured	  things	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow,	  alongside	  our	  knowledge	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow.	  (A	  different	  and	  more	  powerful	  ground	  for	  this	  classification	  is	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  effect	  with	  ‘daylight’	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the	  Levin-­‐Banaji	  faces,	  and	  various	  results	  from	  ‘New	  New	  Look’	  experiments	  about	  wishful	  seeing	  are	  re-­‐described	  by	  several	  contributors	  as	  falling	  squarely	  on	  the	  perceptual	  side	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  perception	  and	  cognition.	  	  	  They	  conclude	  that	  the	  effects	  could	  not	  have	  any	  special	  impact	  on	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  experiences,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  entirely	  intra-­‐perceptual	  processes	  are	  a-­‐rational.	  Even	  if	  pre-­‐conscious	  processing	  involves	  unconscious	  inference,	  such	  as	  Bayesian	  reasoning,	  it	  is	  at	  best	  as-­if	  rational	  or	  as-­if	  irrational,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  operates	  entirely	  at	  the	  level	  of	  perception.	  Such	  inferences	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  epistemic	  norms	  we	  apply	  to	  persons,	  when	  we	  say	  that	  the	  person	  is	  rational	  or	  irrational,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  psychological	  processes	  being	  epistemically	  well-­‐formed	  and	  maintained,	  or	  epistemically	  ill-­‐formed	  and	  maintained.	  (For	  example,	  a	  person	  is	  irrational	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  hold	  an	  epistemically	  ill-­‐formed	  belief).11	  According	  to	  the	  deflationary	  idea	  that	  several	  contributors	  express,	  no	  inferences	  leading	  up	  the	  putative	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  they	  discuss	  are	  subject	  to	  these	  epistemic	  norms,	  however	  redolent	  those	  inferences	  may	  be	  to	  ones	  that	  are.12	  	  	  	  	  	   When	  is	  a	  route	  to	  perceptual	  experiences	  rationally	  evaluable?	  	  We	  are	  used	  to	  asking	  how	  reliable	  or	  truth-­‐conducive	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  may	  be.	  
Reliabilists	  about	  epistemic	  justification	  take	  the	  answer	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  those	  experiences,	  whereas	  non-­‐Reliabilists	  don’t.13	  Even	  fictional	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  like	  the	  two	  we	  started	  with	  (Jack	  and	  Jill,	  fictionalized	  memory	  color)	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experiences	  might	  be	  rationally	  evaluable.	  The	  kind	  of	  rational	  evaluability	  I	  introduced	  earlier	  is	  independent	  of	  reliabilism.	  If	  a	  route	  to	  experience	  is	  rationally	  evaluable,	  then	  due	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  colors	  yellow	  and	  blue,	  and	  relative	  weakness	  for	  red	  and	  green.	  Why	  the	  effects	  are	  uneven	  in	  this	  way	  remains	  to	  be	  explained).	  
11	  Note	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  process	  is	  person-­‐level	  (a	  process	  the	  person	  undergoes,	  as	  opposed	  to	  part	  of	  the	  person)	  that	  it	  is	  rationally	  evaluable.	  If	  I	  blink	  my	  eyelids	  rapidly,	  knowing	  that	  the	  blinking	  will	  make	  me	  dizzy,	  this	  route	  to	  my	  dizziness	  is	  not	  thereby	  subject	  to	  person-­‐level	  epistemic	  norms.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  personal	  and	  sub-­‐personal	  processes	  and	  explanations,	  see	  Drayson	  (2012).	  	  12	  DeRoy	  may	  have	  this	  idea	  in	  mind	  when	  she	  describes	  perceptual	  representations	  as	  ‘non-­‐rational’:	  “Although	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  shown	  what	  kind	  of	  non-­‐conceptual	  correspondence	  could	  explain	  the	  privileged	  integration	  between	  congruent	  kettles	  and	  whistles,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  effect	  on	  multisensory	  integration	  is	  …	  coming	  from	  …non-­‐conceptual,	  opaque	  and	  non-­‐rational	  representations	  of	  congruence,	  rather	  than	  from	  our	  beliefs	  or	  knowledge	  about	  objects.”	  Similar	  ideas	  are	  expressed	  by	  Brogaard	  and	  Gatzia	  (ms).	  
13	  On	  reliabilism,	  see	  Goldman	  and	  McGrath	  (forthcoming),	  Epistemology:	  A	  Contempoary	  
Introduction.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  and	  Goldman,	  Alvin,	  "Reliabilism",	  The	  Stanford	  
Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Spring	  2011	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  URL	  =	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reliabilism/>.	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to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  experience	  an	  psychological	  states	  that	  help	  generate	  it,	  its	  rational	  power	  is	  impacted.	  How	  could	  it	  be	  impacted?	  (Here	  I	  pick	  up	  the	  question	  left	  behind	  earlier).	  In	  three	  ways:	  it	  either	  has	  less	  power	  to	  support	  certain	  beliefs	  than	  they	  would	  absent	  those	  precursors;14	  or	  it	  has	  more	  power	  to	  do	  so;	  or	  it	  has	  the	  usual	  amount,	  but	  has	  it	  in	  part	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  relationship	  with	  those	  psychological	  precursors.	  	  	   Most	  discussions	  of	  putative	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  focus	  on	  the	  
reduction	  of	  epistemic	  power.	  The	  fact	  (if	  it	  is	  a	  fact)	  that	  the	  there	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  any	  impact	  on	  the	  rational	  powers	  of	  experience	  due	  to	  influences	  by	  what	  you	  believe,	  suspect,	  want,	  know,	  or	  fear	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  rationally	  evaluable	  route	  to	  perceptual	  experience.	  The	  philosophical	  problem	  is	  then	  to	  identify	  which	  routes	  these	  are.	  If	  Jack’s	  beliefs	  or	  fears	  could	  influence	  his	  anger-­‐experience	  of	  Jill	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reduces	  its	  rational	  power,	  why	  couldn’t	  his	  stored	  representations	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow	  reduce	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  the	  yellow-­‐banana	  experience?15	  Which	  features	  of	  a	  route	  to	  experience	  make	  it	  rationally	  evaluable?	  	  	   Some	  contributors	  rely	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  perception	  and	  cognition	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  dividing	  the	  rationally	  evaluable	  routes	  to	  experience	  from	  the	  a-­‐rational	  ones.	  But	  many	  distinctions	  do	  business	  under	  the	  label	  ‘perception	  versus	  cognition’.	  These	  include:	  the	  distinction	  between	  iconic	  and	  propositional	  format;	  early	  vision	  versus	  visual	  cognition;	  conceptual	  versus	  non-­‐conceptual	  content;	  representations	  that	  depend	  on	  current	  stimuli	  versus	  those	  that	  don’t;	  representations	  internal	  to	  sensory	  modalities	  versus	  those	  external	  to	  them.16	  The	  elements	  of	  all	  these	  distinctions	  are	  themselves	  underspecified.	  Even	  if	  we	  could	  regiment	  the	  distinction	  perception	  and	  cognition	  by	  sharpening	  and	  selecting	  one	  of	  the	  many	  distinctions	  that	  go	  under	  that	  label,	  further	  principles	  would	  still	  be	  needed	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  processes	  that	  are	  purely	  perceptual	  in	  the	  selected	  sense	  fall	  outside	  the	  domain	  the	  epistemic	  norms.	  A	  more	  direct	  approach	  would	  probe	  directly	  which	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  We	  can	  think	  of	  reduction	  as	  reduction	  below	  a	  baseline,	  relative	  to	  which	  we	  normally	  have	  pretty	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  our	  eyes.	  	  	  	  15	  I	  thank	  Zoe	  Jenkin	  for	  pressing	  this	  question,	  and	  for	  many	  illuminating	  discussions	  about	  how	  to	  answer	  it.	  She	  addresses	  the	  question	  in	  her	  paper	  “Perceptual	  Expectation	  and	  Epistemic	  Downgrade”.	  	  16	  See	  Fodor	  (1983)	  and	  Carey	  (2010)	  on	  iconic	  vs	  propositional	  format;	  Evans	  (1982)	  on	  conceptual	  versus	  non-­‐conceptual	  content;	  Pylyshyn	  (1999),	  Raftopoulos	  (2009),	  Brogaard	  and	  Gatzia	  on	  early	  vision;	  Beck	  (ms)	  on	  stimulus-­‐dependent	  versus	  stimulus	  independent	  representations.	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How	  can	  we	  probe	  this	  question?	  Below	  I	  outline	  three	  approaches.	  I	  illustrate	  each	  one	  using	  the	  case	  of	  memory	  color,	  and	  discuss	  whether	  the	  effect	  on	  color	  experience	  from	  memory	  color	  would	  be	  rationally	  evaluable,	  even	  it	  results	  from	  processes	  that	  many	  contributors	  classify	  as	  perceptual	  rather	  than	  cognitive.	  My	  discussion	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  establish	  that	  influences	  by	  memory	  color	  on	  color	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.17	  	  But	  it	  highlights	  the	  kinds	  of	  considerations	  that	  help	  answer	  the	  larger	  question	  of	  which	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable,	  without	  relying	  on	  an	  independent	  classification	  of	  an	  influencing	  state	  as	  either	  cognitive	  or	  perceptual.	  
	  
Approach	  1:	  Find	  the	  limits	  from	  below	  Let	  us	  take	  it	  as	  a	  fixed	  point	  that	  there	  limits	  from	  below	  on	  which	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable:	  not	  every	  route	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  rationally	  evaluable.	  When	  a	  route	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  not	  rationally	  evaluable,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  it	  is	  a-­‐rational.18	  To	  find	  the	  limits	  from	  below	  on	  which	  routes	  to	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable	  would	  be	  to	  identify	  in	  	  general	  terms	  the	  a-­‐rational	  routes	  to	  experience.	  Routes	  to	  experience	  that	  fall	  outside	  those	  limits	  would	  then	  be	  decent	  candidates	  for	  being	  rationally	  evaluable.	  To	  execute	  this	  approach,	  one	  can	  consider	  examples	  of	  a-­‐rational	  psychological	  processes	  in	  which	  psychological	  states	  influence	  perceptual	  experience,	  focus	  on	  representations	  involved	  in	  those	  routes	  to	  experience,	  and	  try	  to	  identify	  which	  features	  of	  those	  representations,	  or	  of	  the	  process	  linking	  them	  to	  experience,	  makes	  that	  route	  to	  experience	  a-­‐rational.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  If	  memory	  color	  had	  rationally	  evaluable	  effects	  on	  color	  experience,	  there	  are	  multiple	  effects	  these	  could	  be.	  The	  option	  most	  often	  discussed	  is	  reduction	  rational	  power	  of	  experience,	  relative	  either	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  color	  experience	  (‘x	  is	  yellow’)	  or	  the	  content	  of	  influencing	  state	  (‘banana-­‐shaped	  and	  textured	  things	  are	  yellow’).	  Other	  options	  echo	  the	  ones	  listed	  earlier:	  increase	  the	  power	  of	  experience	  to	  rationally	  support	  its	  contents	  or	  other	  propositions,	  relative	  to	  a	  baseline;	  or	  it	  simply	  change	  the	  factors	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  the	  experience	  provides	  baseline	  amount	  of	  justification.	  	  	  	  18	  What	  is	  it	  for	  a	  state	  S	  or	  process	  P	  to	  be	  a-­‐rational?	  At	  a	  minimum,	  there	  is	  no	  respect	  in	  which	  her	  being	  in	  S	  or	  undergoing	  P	  constitutes	  her	  being	  rational,	  and	  no	  respect	  in	  which	  it	  constitutes	  her	  being	  irrational.	  
19	  A	  different	  approach	  would	  aim	  to	  identify	  in	  general	  terms	  what	  can	  make	  a	  state	  a-­‐rational,	  and	  then	  see	  if	  those	  general	  terms	  would	  count	  any	  representations	  involved	  in	  memory	  color	  as	  a-­‐rational.	  For	  instance,	  a	  potentially	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  being	  an	  a-­‐rational	  representational	  state	  is	  that	  its	  formation	  is	  not	  due	  to	  any	  of	  the	  properties	  it	  represents,	  and	  it	  cannot	  develop	  or	  be	  adjusted	  in	  any	  way	  that	  would	  make	  it	  sensitive	  to	  those	  properties.	  This	  proposal	  would	  not	  count	  any	  memory	  color	  representations	  as	  a-­‐rational,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  those	  representations	  are	  learned	  from	  patterns	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  properties	  they	  represent.	  Thanks	  to	  Eric	  Mandelbaum	  for	  discussion.	  	  
	  	   9	  
Some	  contributors	  suggest	  that	  if	  putative	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  are	  due	  chiefly	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  representation	  that	  is	  “implicit”	  20,	  then	  it	  has	  no	  epistemically	  significant	  effects	  on	  perceptual	  experience.21	  To	  make	  contact	  with	  this	  suggestion,	  we	  can	  start	  with	  some	  examples	  of	  uncontroversially	  a-­‐rational	  processes	  containing	  uncontroversially	  implicit	  representations	  that	  encode	  transitions	  from	  one	  representation	  to	  another.	  	  So	  let	  us	  take	  it	  as	  another	  fixed	  point	  that	  a-­‐rational	  processes	  include:	  the	  inference	  from	  contrasts	  to	  edges,	  the	  inference	  from	  certain	  edges	  to	  depth	  representations,	  and	  the	  inference	  from	  certain	  spatio-­‐temporal	  cues	  to	  representations	  of	  causation.22	  	  	  	  How	  can	  we	  generalize	  beyond	  these	  examples	  to	  assess	  whether	  other	  representations	  are	  rationally	  evaluable,	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  involved	  in	  memory	  color	  that	  may	  go	  on	  to	  influence	  perceptual	  experiences?	  I’ll	  consider	  several	  features	  of	  them	  and	  argue	  that	  either	  they	  don’t	  apply	  to	  memory	  color	  representations,	  or	  they	  are	  poor	  candidates	  for	  illuminating	  what	  makes	  a	  process	  a-­‐rational,	  or	  both.	  	  A	  first	  suggestion	  that	  the	  paradigmatically	  a-­‐rational	  inferences	  encode	  information	  in	  a	  different	  format	  than	  the	  belief	  that	  bananas	  are	  yellow.	  This	  feature	  is	  a	  poor	  candidate	  for	  making	  a	  process	  a-­‐rational.	  If	  perceptual	  experiences	  or	  imaginative	  states	  as	  of	  yellow	  oblong	  shapes	  had	  an	  iconic	  format,	  then	  this	  format	  would	  presumably	  not	  preclude	  the	  experience	  from	  providing	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  something	  yellow	  and	  oblong	  was	  nearby,	  or	  the	  imagination	  from	  providing	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  yellow	  things	  can	  be	  oblong.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  term	  “implicit	  representation”	  can	  be	  confusing	  if	  one	  thinks	  of	  implicit	  states	  as	  rules	  or	  transitions	  from	  one	  representation	  to	  another,	  such	  as	  the	  modus	  ponens	  inference	  rule,	  or	  the	  rule	  for	  computing	  edges	  from	  contrasts.	  For	  purposes	  of	  discussion,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  these	  states	  as	  implicitly	  representing	  modus	  ponens,	  or	  the	  conditional	  that	  if	  there	  are	  contrasts	  meeting	  certain	  specifications,	  then	  there	  are	  edges	  that	  meet	  certain	  other	  specifications.	  To	  say	  that	  they	  are	  implicit	  marks	  their	  functional	  difference	  from	  the	  representations	  that	  they	  relate.	  Shea	  (2014)	  offers	  a	  useful	  discussion	  of	  implicit	  representation.	  	  21	  In	  their	  contribution,	  Dokic	  and	  Marin	  write	  about	  memory	  color:	  “We	  expect	  from	  a	  case	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  that	  it	  reflects	  the	  influence	  of	  high-­‐level	  conscious	  (at	  least,	  accessible)	  cognitive	  states	  upon	  perceptual	  contents	  –	  for	  instance,	  an	  influence	  from	  background	  knowledge.	  However,	  Bayesian	  priors	  are	  not	  part	  of	  such	  high-­‐level	  cognitive	  accessible	  contents,	  but	  amount	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  implicit	  knowledge	  the	  brain	  uses	  to	  operate	  statistical	  inferences	  in	  presence	  of	  uncertainties	  (they	  constitute	  a	  “theory	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  system”,	  Raftopoulos,	  2009,	  p.	  270)”	  -­‐-­‐Note	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  information	  process	  conforms	  to	  Bayes’	  Theorem	  does	  not	  establish	  its	  status	  as	  cognitive	  or	  perceptual,	  or	  what	  whether	  it	  has	  any	  features	  that	  might	  bear	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.	  Presumably	  some	  processes	  that	  conform	  to	  Bayes’	  Theorem	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.	  	  
22	  Another	  example	  of	  an	  implicit	  representation:	  the	  syntactic	  rules	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  discern	  whether	  a	  string	  of	  words	  is	  an	  English	  sentence.	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  A	  second	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  implicit	  representations	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  by	  the	  subject	  at	  all,	  or	  else	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  without	  significant	  investigation.	  This	  feature	  applies	  as	  well	  to	  the	  heuristics	  uncovered	  by	  Tversky	  and	  Kahneman,	  and	  to	  implicit	  assumptions	  that	  guide	  our	  reasoning	  but	  that	  take	  a	  lot	  of	  reflection	  or	  experimental	  investigation	  to	  unearth,	  such	  as	  the	  kinds	  we	  often	  say	  were	  “not	  on	  the	  radar”	  in	  studying	  scientific	  theories	  from	  the	  past.23	  Since	  both	  implicit	  assumptions	  and	  formation	  of	  beliefs	  using	  heuristics	  are	  rationally	  evaluable,	  it	  is	  not	  in	  general	  true	  that	  an	  inability	  to	  formulate	  the	  content	  of	  an	  implicit	  representation	  (or	  unawareness	  that	  one	  has	  a	  representation)	  make	  the	  reliance	  on	  an	  implicit	  representation	  a-­‐rational.	  	  	  	  	  A	  third	  suggestion	  is	  that	  implicit	  representations	  that	  encode	  transitions	  from	  contrasts	  to	  edges	  are	  representations	  we	  can	  have	  without	  having	  any	  concepts	  of	  the	  properties	  contrast	  or	  edge.	  (A	  parallel	  observation	  holds	  for	  the	  other	  examples	  of	  implicit	  representations	  we	  started	  with).	  If	  lacking	  such	  concepts	  made	  this	  process	  a-­‐rational,	  then	  some	  other	  explanation	  would	  be	  needed	  of	  why	  they	  remain	  a-­‐rational	  once	  we	  gain	  concepts	  of	  those	  properties.	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  memory	  color,	  most	  of	  us	  have	  concepts	  of	  the	  color	  yellow,	  and	  of	  the	  shapes	  and	  textures	  characteristic	  of	  bananas	  (smooth	  in	  parts,	  stubby	  at	  the	  stem,	  etc).	  	  	  A	  fourth	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  transitions	  in	  our	  paradigms	  of	  a-­‐rational	  processes	  are	  immalleable	  by	  any	  other	  psychological	  process.	  Such	  immalleability	  arguably	  could	  help	  make	  a	  psychological	  state	  a-­‐rational.	  This	  strategy	  may	  be	  promising	  way	  to	  find	  the	  limit	  from	  below,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  memory	  color,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  links	  between	  shapes,	  textures	  and	  colors	  could	  change	  by	  some	  of	  the	  same	  processes	  that	  established	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  such	  as	  patterns	  of	  exposure.	  	  A	  last	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  implicit	  representations	  have	  no	  function	  in	  the	  mind	  other	  than	  to	  execute	  the	  transitions	  that	  they	  encode.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  limited	  functional	  role	  is	  that	  the	  implicitly	  represented	  information	  is	  unavailable	  for	  use	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  inferences.	  	  	  If	  its	  limited	  inferential	  availability	  is	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  reliance	  on	  implicit	  representations	  a-­‐rational,	  then	  our	  question	  should	  be:	  how	  much	  inferential	  availability,	  and	  what	  kind,	  would	  the	  key	  influencing	  state	  need	  to	  have,	  for	  its	  role	  in	  producing	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  be	  rationally	  evaluable?	  It	  is	  implausible	  to	  require	  global	  inferential	  availability	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  an	  ingredient	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Consider	  medieval	  alchemists	  concept	  of	  weight,	  which	  would	  allow	  a	  few	  pounds	  of	  lead	  to	  be	  turned	  into	  hundreds	  of	  pounds	  of	  gold.	  Presumably	  they	  could	  not	  easily	  formulate	  the	  assumption	  that	  weight	  was	  not	  an	  extensive	  magnitude.	  For	  discussion	  of	  contrasting	  conceptual	  schemes	  related	  to	  weight,	  see	  Carey	  (2010)	  chapter	  10.	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rationally	  evaluable	  process.	  Think	  of	  compartmentalized	  beliefs,	  which	  are	  not	  available	  for	  full	  range	  of	  processing.	  Suppose	  you	  forget	  that	  you	  have	  an	  appointment	  with	  X	  at	  noon	  when	  you	  make	  an	  appointment	  with	  Y	  at	  noon.	  The	  partial	  inaccessibility	  of	  your	  belief	  that	  you	  will	  meet	  X	  at	  noon	  does	  not	  stop	  it	  from	  participating	  in	  rationally	  evaluable	  inferences.	  For	  instance,	  upon	  finding	  X’s	  umbrella	  you	  might	  plan	  on	  giving	  it	  back	  to	  her	  when	  you	  see	  her	  at	  noon,	  without	  yet	  noticing	  your	  conflicting	  appointments.	  The	  rational	  status	  of	  the	  resulting	  belief	  that	  X	  will	  get	  her	  umbrella	  back	  seems	  influenced	  by	  its	  reliance	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  you	  are	  meeting	  X	  at	  noon.24	  Partial	  inaccessibility	  is	  no	  bar	  to	  participating	  in	  rationally	  evaluable	  routes	  to	  belief.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  true	  in	  general	  that	  inaccessibility	  of	  a	  psychological	  state	  prevents	  it	  from	  impacting	  the	  rational	  statue	  of	  other	  states	  that	  depend	  on	  it.	  	  	  	  	   If	  limited	  inferential	  availability	  makes	  reliance	  on	  implicit	  representation	  a-­‐rational,	  then	  in	  probing	  whether	  any	  effect	  of	  memory	  color	  on	  experience	  is	  rationally	  evaluable,	  we	  should	  consider	  how	  wide	  the	  range	  of	  circumstances	  is	  in	  which	  the	  generalization	  about	  color	  is	  activated.	  Call	  shapes	  and	  texture	  characteristic	  of	  bananas	  ‘B-­‐shapes’	  for	  short,	  and	  suppose	  that	  memory	  color	  effects	  comes	  from	  intra-­‐perceptual	  generalization	  that	  B-­‐shapes	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow.	  	  What	  activates	  this	  generalization?	  Can	  it	  be	  activated	  by	  an	  imagination	  or	  hallucination	  of	  B-­‐shapes,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  perception	  of	  them?	  As	  the	  range	  widens,	  it	  looks	  more	  like	  a	  case	  of	  compartmentalized	  belief	  than	  the	  highly	  circumscribed	  syntactic	  information,	  or	  a	  mere	  transitions	  from	  one	  state	  to	  another.	  	  	  	   These	  suggestions	  do	  not	  yet	  illuminate	  why	  there	  are	  limits	  from	  below	  on	  the	  rational	  evaluability	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  But	  they	  put	  pressure	  on	  excluding	  the	  influence	  of	  memory	  color	  representations	  on	  perceptual	  experience	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  epistemic	  norms.	  	  	  	  
Approach	  2:	  The	  Explanatory	  Approach	  How	  else	  might	  we	  probe	  which	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable?	  	  A	  second	  approach	  starts	  by	  asking	  whether	  there	  is	  anything	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  some	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable	  could	  explain.	  An	  explanatory	  role	  for	  this	  hypothesis	  would	  give	  us	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  What	  is	  the	  rational	  status	  of	  your	  belief	  that	  X	  will	  get	  her	  umbrella	  back	  (the	  ‘umbrella-­‐belief’)?	  Its	  rational	  status	  seems	  obviously	  influenced	  by	  your	  belief	  that	  you’ll	  meet	  X	  at	  noon	  (the	  ‘meeting-­‐X	  belief’).	  On	  one	  view,	  the	  umbrella-­‐belief	  is	  well-­‐founded	  by	  the	  meeting-­‐X	  belief,	  together	  with	  your	  belief	  that	  you’ll	  return	  X’s	  umbrella	  then.	  A	  different	  option	  is	  that	  the	  umbrella-­‐belief	  is	  ill-­‐founded,	  because	  your	  belief	  that	  you’ll	  meet	  X	  is	  noon	  is	  made	  irrational	  by	  your	  belief	  that	  you’ll	  meet	  Y	  at	  noon,	  and	  that	  you	  can’t	  meet	  them	  both	  at	  once.	  On	  either	  option,	  a	  belief	  with	  limited	  accessibility	  (the	  meeting-­‐X-­‐belief)	  influences	  the	  rational	  status	  of	  another	  belief.	  The	  options	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  a	  prohibition	  against	  inconsistency	  governs	  relationships	  between	  beliefs	  in	  different	  compartments.	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reason	  to	  believe	  it.	  Any	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  hypothesis	  plays	  an	  explanatory	  role	  will	  contain	  factors	  that	  make	  the	  route	  to	  experience	  rationally	  evaluable.	  We	  can	  then	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  which	  factors	  these	  are,	  drawing	  on	  the	  specific	  character	  of	  the	  case.	   	  A	  straightforward	  application	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Jack	  and	  Jill	  from	  the	  start.	  The	  main	  ingredients	  of	  the	  argument	  are	  these:	  	  
Bootstrapping	  intuition:	  Jack’s	  experience	  that	  Jill	  is	  angry	  does	  not	  give	  him	  additional	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  that	  Jill	  is	  angry.	  
	  
The	  Inferential	  Hypothesis:	  The	  Bootstrapping	  intuition	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  inference-­‐like	  relation	  of	  rational	  dependence	  that	  the	  experience	  stands	  in	  to	  the	  antecedent	  beliefs.	  The	  inferential	  hypothesis	  entails	  the	  Rational	  Evaluability	  hypothesis:	  	  
Rational	  evaluability	  hypothesis:	  Some	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.	  	  An	  Explanatory	  approach	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Bootstrapping	  intuition	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  Inferential	  hypothesis.	  How	  could	  the	  Rational	  Evaluability	  hypothesis	  explain	  the	  bootstrapping	  intuition?	  A	  natural	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  intuition	  is	  explained	  by	  illicitly	  circular	  structure	  that	  would	  emerge	  if	  Jack	  strengthened	  his	  belief	  in	  response	  to	  his	  experience.	  More	  argument	  is	  needed	  to	  show	  that	  this	  is	  the	  best	  explanation.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  natural	  candidate.	  If	  it	  is	  a	  strong	  candidate,	  then	  we	  have	  identified	  a	  structural	  relationship	  between	  experience	  and	  its	  psychological	  precursors	  that	  makes	  the	  experience	  rationally	  evaluable.	  We	  can	  then	  ask	  in	  what	  other	  domains	  the	  same	  structure	  might	  be	  found.	  In	  particular,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  it	  would	  take	  for	  such	  a	  structure	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  memory	  color.	  Could	  there	  be	  analogs	  in	  that	  case	  of	  the	  Bootstrapping	  intuition?	  More	  generally,	  is	  there	  anything	  for	  the	  Rational	  Evaluability	  hypothesis	  to	  explain	  about	  memory	  color?	  	  	   To	  address	  these	  questions,	  let	  us	  examine	  more	  closely	  the	  putatitve	  illicitly	  circular	  structure	  that	  many	  find	  in	  the	  Jack	  and	  Jill	  case.	  	   When	  one	  and	  the	  same	  state	  both	  generates	  an	  experience	  and	  is	  psychologically	  strengthened	  by	  it,	  this	  structure	  is	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  being	  irrational.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Jack	  and	  Jill,	  Jack’s	  belief	  that	  Jill	  is	  angry	  plays	  two	  roles:	  it	  helps	  generate	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  Jill	  looks	  angry	  to	  Jack,	  and	  it	  is	  strengthened	  by	  that	  very	  experience.	  It	  is	  strengthened	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Jack	  increases	  his	  confidence	  that	  Jill	  is	  angry	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  experience.	  	  	  What	  about	  memory	  color?	  First,	  suppose	  that	  one	  strengthens	  one’s	  confidence	  (a	  form	  of	  belief)	  that	  B-­‐shaped	  things	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  experience	  that	  d	  is	  B-­‐shaped	  and	  yellow,	  and	  suppose	  that	  a	  generalization	  that	  B-­‐shapes	  are	  yellow	  helped	  generate	  that	  very	  experience.	  Finally,	  suppose	  that	  the	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generalization	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  something	  other	  than	  a	  belief.	  If	  the	  state	  that	  causes	  the	  experience	  is	  not	  the	  state	  that	  is	  strengthened	  by	  it,	  then	  the	  strengthening	  is	  a	  poor	  candidate	  for	  irrational	  circularity.25	  	  	   This	  situation	  is	  the	  one	  many	  contributors	  think	  we	  are	  in.	  According	  to	  them,	  we	  have	  “merely	  perceptual”	  representation	  that	  B-­‐shapes	  are	  yellow	  (or	  a	  “merely	  perceptual”	  association	  between	  B-­‐shapes	  and	  yellow),	  that	  representation	  helps	  produce	  yellowish	  experiences,	  and	  those	  yellowish	  experiences	  are	  perfectly	  poised	  to	  rationally	  strengthen	  beliefs	  about	  the	  color	  of	  the	  banana.	  	  	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the	  Jack	  and	  Jill	  case,	  the	  threat	  of	  illicit	  circularity	  arises,	  in	  part	  because	  one	  and	  the	  same	  state	  generates	  the	  experience	  and	  is	  strengthened	  by	  it,	  if	  Jack	  strengthens	  his	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  experience.	  For	  there	  to	  be	  forms	  of	  illicit	  intra-­‐perceptual	  circularity	  in	  which	  the	  generalization	  helps	  produce	  the	  experience,	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  an	  analogous	  two-­‐part	  structure.	  	  	  	   First,	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  way	  for	  the	  experience	  to	  psychologically	  strengthen	  the	  generalization,	  consistent	  with	  its	  belonging	  to	  a	  perceptual	  system.	  The	  strengthening	  might	  consist	  in	  a	  stronger	  “yellowification”	  signal	  in	  response	  to	  B-­‐shapes,	  or	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  B-­‐shapes	  produce	  yellowification	  signal,	  or	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  both	  B-­‐shapes	  and	  yellow	  signals	  are	  sent.26	  	  	   	  Second,	  the	  strengthening	  by	  experience	  would	  have	  to	  be	  rationally	  evaluable.	  	  Here	  we	  are	  asking	  whether	  an	  intra-­‐perceptual	  generalization	  can	  be	  rationally	  strengthened	  by	  experience,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  route	  to	  experience	  from	  the	  generalization	  is	  rationally	  evaluable.	  Supposing	  that	  the	  generalization	  in	  memory	  color	  is	  intra-­‐perceptual,	  can	  it	  be	  either	  rationally	  or	  irrationally	  strengthened	  by	  experience?	  	  	  	   Here	  there	  is	  a	  major	  disanalogy	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Jack	  and	  Jill,	  where	  the	  circular	  structure	  includes	  Jack’s	  belief.	  Jack’s	  belief	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  state	  that	  can	  be	  strengthened	  rationally	  or	  irrationally	  by	  experience.	  In	  contrast,	  whether	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Why	  is	  it	  a	  poor	  candidate	  for	  irrational	  circularity,	  if	  the	  state	  that	  generates	  the	  experience	  and	  the	  state	  it	  strengthens	  have	  overlapping	  accuracy	  conditions	  (e.g.,	  both	  have	  accuracy	  condition	  ‘B-­‐shapes	  are	  yellow’)?	  It	  is	  a	  poor	  candidate	  because	  sharing	  accuracy	  conditions	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  a	  transition	  irrational.	  For	  example,	  when	  one	  endorses	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience,	  one	  forms	  a	  belief	  with	  a	  content	  that	  is	  also	  a	  content	  of	  one’s	  experience,	  but	  endorsement	  is	  not	  thereby	  irrational.	  	  26	  If	  in	  addition	  there	  was	  an	  unconscious	  representation	  of	  a	  grey	  banana,	  it	  might	  weaken	  the	  association,	  in	  a	  way	  worked	  against	  the	  strengthening	  by	  the	  yellowish	  experience.	  If	  the	  unconscious	  perception	  is	  a	  distribution	  of	  probabilities	  over	  colors,	  then	  the	  increment	  of	  strengthening	  might	  depend	  on	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  ‘yellow’	  possibilities.	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generalizations	  that	  aren’t	  beliefs	  can	  be	  strengthened	  rationally	  by	  experience	  is	  up	  for	  grabs.	  So	  long	  as	  this	  is	  up	  for	  grabs,	  we	  don’t	  have	  an	  analogy	  to	  the	  Bootstrapping	  intuition	  about	  Jack’s	  belief.	  Since	  the	  Bootstrapping	  intuition	  was	  the	  thing	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  explanatory	  strategy	  outlined	  earlier,	  that	  strategy	  has	  no	  straightforward	  extension	  to	  intra-­‐perceptual	  cases.	  	  The	  explanatory	  approach	  could	  be	  extended	  in	  this	  way,	  only	  if	  there	  were	  grounds	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  generalization	  can	  be	  strengthened	  rationally	  or	  irrationally	  by	  experience.	  Perhaps	  such	  grounds	  could	  be	  leveraged	  into	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  potential	  rational	  evaluability	  of	  circular	  intra-­‐perceptual	  structures.27	  	  
Approach	  3:	  The	  Defeat	  Model	  The	  circular	  structure	  invoked	  by	  the	  Explanatory	  approach	  is	  not	  the	  only	  structure	  that	  is	  a	  candidate	  for	  a	  rationally	  evaluable	  intra-­‐perceptual	  process.	  A	  different	  structure	  involves	  overriding	  unconscious	  perceptions	  that	  offer	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  their	  contents.	  	  	  To	  fix	  ideas,	  consider	  a	  structurally	  analogous	  route	  to	  belief.	  You	  know	  that	  X	  is	  behind	  a	  curtain	  and	  you	  can’t	  see	  X,	  but	  you	  know	  that	  X	  is	  B-­‐shaped.	  	  You’ve	  got	  some	  reason	  to	  think	  X	  is	  yellow,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  come	  from	  perceiving	  X	  –	  it	  comes	  from	  your	  knowledge	  that	  B-­‐shaped	  things	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow.	  	  Then	  the	  curtain	  is	  lifted	  and	  you	  see	  X.	  X	  is	  grey,	  and	  X	  looks	  grey.	  You’ve	  got	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  anything	  is	  abnormal,	  and	  your	  experience	  is	  caused	  primarily	  by	  X	  in	  the	  usual	  manner.	  	  There	  will	  be	  some	  cases	  with	  this	  structure	  in	  which	  it	  will	  be	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  update	  your	  antecedent	  belief	  and	  form	  the	  belief	  that	  X	  is	  grey.	  Normally,	  when	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  update	  one’s	  belief	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  one’s	  perception	  of	  X	  outweighs	  the	  information	  one	  has	  by	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  inference.	  	  And	  normally,	  in	  this	  situation	  it	  is	  irrational	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  inference	  instead	  of	  by	  the	  perception.	  Could	  any	  memory	  color	  effect	  on	  perceptual	  experience	  fit	  this	  model?	  An	  analogous	  route	  to	  experience	  might	  take	  a	  form	  illustrated	  by	  this	  dialogue	  between	  the	  visual	  system	  and	  a	  banana.	  	   VS:	  What	  color	  are	  you?	  	   	   X:	  I’m	  grey.	  	   	   VS:	  But	  you’re	  B-­‐shaped.	  You	  must	  be	  yellow.	  	  Here,	  the	  stored	  information	  linking	  B-­‐shaped	  things	  to	  yellow	  intervenes	  before	  the	  experience,	  but	  after	  the	  representation	  of	  grey	  that	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	  grey	  banana.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  In	  “Perceptual	  Expectations	  and	  Epistemic	  Downgrade”,	  Jenkin	  develops	  in	  detail	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  can	  be	  epistemically	  illicit	  intra-­‐perceptual	  circularity.	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An	  inference	  from	  the	  generalization	  generates	  an	  experience	  overriding	  an	  unconscious	  perception	  that	  x	  is	  grey.	  	   	   Fig.	  1:	  Inference	  overrides	  unconscious	  perception.	  	  	   Inference	   Unconscious	  
Perception	  
Stored	  representation:	  	   B-­‐shapes	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow	   	  
Current	  representation:	   X	  is	  a	  B-­‐shape	   	  
	   	   X	  is	  grey	  
Experience:	   X	  is	  yellow.	   	  	  Continuing	  the	  analogy	  with	  the	  curtain	  case,	  psychologically,	  the	  intra-­‐perceptual	  generalization	  that	  B-­‐shaped	  things	  tend	  to	  be	  yellow	  would	  take	  the	  place	  of	  knowledge	  of	  that	  generalization,	  and	  unconscious	  perceptions	  that	  X	  is	  B-­‐shaped	  and	  that	  X	  is	  grey	  would	  take	  the	  place	  of	  knowing	  that	  X	  is	  B-­‐shaped	  and	  seeing	  X	  once	  the	  curtain	  is	  lifted.	  Could	  this	  process	  be	  rationally	  evaluable?	  Here	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  it	  could.	  
Argument	  from	  defeat	  of	  unconscious	  perception	  	  P1.	  An	  unconscious	  perception	  that	  represents	  that	  x	  is	  F	  can	  have	  rational	  power	  to	  support	  believing	  that	  x	  is	  F.	  P2.	  If	  an	  unconscious	  perception	  that	  represents	  that	  x	  is	  F	  can	  have	  rational	  power	  to	  support	  believing	  that	  x	  is	  F,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  irrational	  for	  it	  to	  be	  overridden	  in	  a	  route	  to	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  content:	  x	  is	  F.	  P3.	  If	  a	  process	  irrationally	  overrides	  an	  unconscious	  perception,	  then	  the	  process	  is	  rationally	  evaluable.	  Conclusion:	  Some	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable.	  Premise	  3	  is	  a	  natural	  elaboration	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  rationally	  evaluable	  process.	  The	  key	  premises	  are	  P1	  and	  P2.	  	  Defenses	  of	  them	  might	  start	  from	  the	  following	  considerations.	  On	  premise	  P1:	  The	  case	  of	  conflicting	  appointments	  discussed	  earlier	  illustrates	  a	  kind	  of	  state	  that	  is	  not	  entirely	  accessible	  to	  subsequent	  reasoning	  and	  processing,	  but	  that	  has	  rational	  power	  to	  support	  subsequent	  beliefs	  all	  the	  same.	  We	  can	  distinguish	  a	  psychological	  aspect	  of	  these	  beliefs	  from	  an	  epistemic	  aspect.	  Psychologically,	  their	  availability	  for	  inference	  is	  limited.	  Epistemically,	  they	  are	  can	  be	  epistemic	  resources	  that	  subject	  fails	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of.	  Even	  when	  they	  aren’t	  accessed	  for	  inference	  (as	  they	  would	  be	  if	  you	  realized	  that	  you	  had	  conflicting	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appointments),	  they	  retain	  the	  features	  that	  ground	  their	  epistemic	  force	  once	  they	  are	  accessed.	  	  	  Are	  compartmentalized	  beliefs	  the	  only	  states	  with	  this	  pair	  of	  related	  psychological	  and	  epistemic	  features?	  Arguably,	  they	  belong	  to	  a	  wider	  category	  that	  includes	  perceptual	  experiences	  with	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  attentiveness.	  Just	  as	  each	  compartmentalized	  belief	  about	  your	  appointment	  can	  be	  made	  available	  for	  reasoning	  through	  recall,	  so	  too	  inattentive	  experiences	  can	  be	  made	  available	  through	  shifts	  of	  attention.	  Just	  as	  the	  compartmentalized	  belief	  retains	  its	  epistemic	  force	  when	  unaccessed,	  arguably	  the	  inattentive	  experiences	  do	  too.28	  Unconscious	  perceptions	  seem	  to	  fit	  the	  same	  pattern,	  when	  the	  transition	  to	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  leaves	  all	  their	  other	  features	  intact.	  Once	  it	  is	  phenomenally	  conscious,	  it	  will	  belong	  the	  subject’s	  epistemic	  resources	  (assuming	  it	  is	  not	  defeated	  or	  otherwise	  downgraded	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  rational	  power).	  Just	  as	  the	  inattentive	  experience	  could	  easily	  become	  attentive,	  so	  too	  the	  unconscious	  perception	  could	  easily	  become	  phenomenally	  conscious.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  transition	  clearly	  belongs	  to	  the	  subject’s	  epistemic	  resources.	  Given	  that	  only	  a	  minimal	  transition	  is	  needed	  to	  cross	  the	  threshold	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  epistemic	  resources,	  such	  states	  may	  be	  epistemic	  resources	  all	  along,	  and	  compartmentalization,	  inattentiveness,	  or	  unconsciousness	  are	  merely	  ways	  of	  limiting	  our	  access	  to	  them.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  these	  similarities,	  principled	  grounds	  are	  needed	  for	  excluding	  unconscious	  perceptions	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  un-­‐used	  epistemic	  resources.	  These	  considerations	  are	  far	  from	  decisive,	  but	  they	  suggest	  a	  case	  that	  might	  be	  made	  for	  P1.	  Premise	  P2	  purports	  to	  take	  us	  from	  the	  rational	  power	  of	  certain	  unconscious	  perceptions	  to	  the	  rational	  evaluability	  of	  processes	  that	  override	  them.	  Suppose	  it	  is	  granted	  that	  an	  unconscious	  perception	  can	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  its	  contents.	  Then	  consider	  a	  process	  that	  could	  take	  account	  of	  that	  support,	  but	  doesn’t.	  Such	  a	  process	  seems	  analogous	  to	  a	  process	  that	  ignores	  evidence	  that	  one	  has.	  If	  ignoring	  evidence	  is	  irrational,	  then	  the	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  this	  result	  is	  irrationally	  outweighing	  the	  evidence,	  and	  hence	  must	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  process	  that	  is	  rationally	  evaluable.	  	  	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  I’ve	  considered	  three	  approaches	  to	  discovering	  what	  belongs	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  epistemic	  norms.	  Each	  approach	  suggests	  that	  some	  routes	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  rationally	  evaluable,	  in	  the	  sense	  discussed	  earlier:	  the	  perceptual	  depends	  for	  its	  formation	  on	  other	  psychological	  states,	  and	  that	  dependence	  impacts	  its	  power	  to	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  other	  propositions.	  One	  might	  try	  to	  develop	  any	  of	  the	  approaches	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  rational	  evaluability	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  extends	  beyond	  canonical	  cases	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  For	  discussion	  of	  inattentive	  experiences	  and	  their	  epistemic	  status,	  see	  Silins	  and	  Siegel	  (2014).	  I	  think	  Nico	  Silins	  for	  many	  discussions	  of	  un-­‐used	  epistemic	  resources.	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cognitive	  penetration.	  All	  three	  approaches	  give	  us	  tools	  to	  analyze	  how	  far	  into	  the	  mind	  epistemic	  norms	  extend.	  
	   I’ve	  argued	  so	  far	  that	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  psychological	  influences	  on	  perception	  is	  not	  necessarily	  limited	  to	  canonical	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration.	  Next	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  epistemological	  significance	  of	  an	  even	  broader	  family	  of	  effects	  to	  which	  canonical	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  belong.	  	  	  
2.	  Varieties	  of	  top-­down	  effects	  on	  perception	  The	  family	  of	  phenomena	  falling	  under	  the	  general	  rubric	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  belongs	  to	  an	  even	  wider	  class	  of	  potential	  influences	  on	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  judgment.	  We	  can	  distinguish	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  both	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  perceptual	  judgment	  could	  be	  influenced	  by	  other	  psychological	  states	  we	  are	  in.	  Studying	  the	  broader	  family	  of	  effects	  may	  give	  us	  tools	  to	  analyze	  how	  social	  forces	  may	  operate	  through	  perception.	  	   To	  see	  how	  the	  broader	  family	  of	  effects	  applies	  to	  understanding	  of	  social	  phenomena,	  consider	  Keith	  Payne’s	  disturbing	  experiment	  in	  which	  participants	  more	  often	  misclassify	  a	  tool	  (pliers,	  wrench,	  or	  a	  drill)	  as	  a	  gun	  when	  primed	  with	  pictures	  of	  Black	  men,	  compared	  with	  subjects	  who	  have	  been	  primed	  with	  pictures	  of	  White	  men.29	  From	  this	  result,	  we	  know	  that	  whatever	  psychological	  state	  the	  prime	  puts	  the	  subjects	  in,	  it	  influences	  their	  answers	  on	  the	  classification	  task.	  	  	   How	  is	  the	  visual	  experience	  of	  subjects	  in	  Payne’s	  experiment	  affected?	  How	  do	  the	  pliers	  look	  to	  the	  subjects,	  when	  they	  see	  them?	  The	  experiment	  does	  not	  speak	  to	  this	  question,	  and	  the	  results	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  a	  range	  of	  ways:	  
• Disbelief:	  The	  pliers	  look	  to	  the	  subject	  exactly	  like	  pliers.	  Classification	  errors	  are	  driven	  by	  something	  that	  makes	  the	  subjects	  disbelieve	  their	  perceptual	  experience.	  	  
• Bypass:	  The	  pliers	  look	  to	  the	  subject	  exactly	  like	  pliers.	  Classification	  errors	  do	  not	  result	  from	  responses	  of	  any	  kind	  ot	  the	  experience	  –	  not	  even	  disbelief.	  	  	  
• Haste:	  The	  pliers	  do	  not	  look	  like	  pliers	  or	  like	  a	  gun,	  but	  subjects	  jump	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it’s	  a	  gun,	  before	  perceiving	  enough	  detail	  to	  decide	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  they	  see.	  	  
• Introspective	  error:	  The	  pliers	  look	  to	  the	  subject	  exactly	  like	  pliers.	  But	  they	  make	  an	  introspective	  error	  in	  which	  they	  take	  themselves	  to	  experience	  a	  gun.	  
• Automatic,	  disowned	  behavior:	  The	  pliers	  looked	  to	  the	  subject	  exactly	  like	  pliers,	  but	  the	  state	  guides	  behavior	  that	  subjects	  immediately	  afterward	  will	  on	  reflection	  regard	  as	  mistaken.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Payne	  2001.	  The	  subjects	  are	  non-­‐Black	  American	  college	  students,	  though	  similar	  effects	  are	  found	  for	  Black	  American	  college	  students.	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• Cognitive	  penetration:	  The	  pliers	  look	  to	  the	  subject	  like	  a	  gun,	  due	  to	  the	  state	  activated	  by	  the	  Black	  prime	  (where	  by	  stipulation	  the	  state	  is	  activated	  by	  the	  Black	  prime	  counts	  as	  cognitive).	  	  The	  first	  three	  options	  (Disbelief,	  Bypass,	  Haste)	  are	  effects	  on	  perceptual	  judgment.	  The	  second	  two	  (Disbelief,	  Bypass)	  along	  with	  Introspective	  Error	  impact	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  forming	  judgment,	  rather	  than	  the	  contents	  of	  experience.	  	  The	  third	  (Haste)	  leaves	  open	  whether	  the	  prime	  impacts	  the	  extent	  of	  perceptual	  processing	  as	  well	  as	  the	  response	  to	  it	  in	  judgment.	  There	  could	  be	  hasty	  judgment,	  hasty	  perceptual	  experience,	  or	  both.	  The	  last	  option	  (cognitive	  penetration)	  relies	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  extra-­‐perceptual	  or	  intra-­‐perceptual	  influencers,	  which	  we	  saw	  earlier	  remains	  fluid	  absent	  further	  regimentation.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  options	  are	  insensitive	  to	  how	  the	  influencing	  state	  stands	  relative	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  perception.30	  	  Most	  discussion	  of	  epistemological	  impact	  of	  psychological	  influences	  on	  perception	  has	  focused	  on	  canonical	  (even	  if	  fictional)	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetration.	  But	  if	  we	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  social	  forces	  influence	  perception	  without	  our	  awareness,	  and	  our	  question	  is	  how	  they	  do	  so,	  drawing	  these	  distinctions	  gives	  us	  a	  place	  to	  start.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  a	  perceiver	  ends	  up	  either	  perceptually	  experiencing	  what	  she	  already	  suspects	  or	  fears	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  or	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  that	  confirm	  her	  suspicions	  or	  fear.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  they	  are	  all	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  farce.	  The	  farce	  is	  that	  perception	  seems	  to	  open	  our	  minds	  to	  the	  things	  around	  us,	  but	  doesn’t.	  It	  purports	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like,	  so	  that	  if	  need	  be,	  we	  can	  check	  our	  beliefs,	  fears,	  and	  suspicions	  against	  reality	  and	  can	  use	  it	  to	  guide	  our	  actions	  -­‐	  but	  it	  doesn’t.31	  As	  the	  distinctions	  drawn	  above	  show,	  perceptual	  farce	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  even	  the	  most	  canonical	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetrability.	  It	  can	  operate	  through	  influences	  by	  one’s	  own	  outlook	  on	  perceptual	  judgment,	  or	  by	  neutralizing	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  guiding	  those	  judgments,	  or	  by	  selecting	  which	  stimuli	  will	  be	  experienced	  in	  the	  first	  place	  –	  leaving	  perceptual	  experience	  itself	  perfectly	  faithful	  to	  the	  external	  things	  that	  it	  helps	  us	  perceive.	  	  Perceptual	  farce	  also	  encompasses	  systematic	  effects	  on	  attention.	  Any	  pattern	  of	  attention	  will	  include	  some	  stimuli	  and	  exclude	  others.	  Not	  all	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  cognitive	  underpinnings	  of	  implicit	  bias,	  and	  of	  the	  type	  of	  state	  that	  the	  Black	  prime	  puts	  participants	  in,	  see	  Levy	  (forthcoming)	  who	  argues	  that	  it	  isn’t	  a	  belief,	  Mandelbaum	  (ms)	  who	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  a	  belief,	  and	  Brownstein	  (ms)	  who	  will	  review	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  options.	  31	  By	  this	  characterization	  of	  perceptual	  farce,	  any	  case	  of	  illusion,	  no	  matter	  how	  it	  was	  generated,	  would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  perceptual	  farce.	  So	  some	  cases	  of	  it	  will	  be	  more	  interesting	  than	  others	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  configurations	  on	  perception.	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patterns	  will	  give	  a	  misleading	  impression	  of	  openness	  to	  the	  world.	  But	  some	  seem	  to	  do	  so	  clearly.	  	  Consider	  outgroup	  hiring.	  Here	  is	  a	  domain	  in	  which	  the	  main	  task	  of	  inquiry	  is	  to	  respond	  to	  new	  information	  one	  gets	  from	  the	  applicant	  dossiers.	  Information	  in	  the	  dossier,	  we	  can	  suppose,	  comes	  with	  a	  level	  of	  detail	  that	  provides	  the	  kind	  of	  evidence	  that	  can	  outweigh	  antecedent	  generalizations.	  By	  comparison,	  you	  might	  have	  excellent	  evidence	  that	  on	  the	  whole,	  16-­‐year	  olds	  are	  poor	  drivers.	  Upon	  getting	  to	  know	  a	  specific	  16-­‐year	  old,	  you	  will	  be	  better	  placed	  to	  assess	  whether	  this	  generalization	  is	  true	  of	  her.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  outgroup	  hiring,	  readers	  bring	  to	  the	  process	  their	  generalizations	  about	  outgroup	  applications,	  poised	  to	  use	  them	  as	  they	  would	  use	  any	  background	  information	  in	  assessing	  new	  information.	  Just	  as	  you	  might	  come	  across	  a	  16-­‐year	  old	  who	  is	  a	  good	  driver,	  contrary	  to	  your	  antecedent	  assumption	  about	  16-­‐year	  olds,	  so	  too	  you	  might	  come	  across	  an	  outgroup	  applicant	  who	  is	  stronger	  than	  antecedent	  assumptions	  would	  predict.	  If	  social	  forces,	  or	  the	  affective	  profile	  that	  goes	  with	  them,	  influenced	  the	  process	  of	  information	  uptake	  by	  putting	  a	  halt	  to	  processing	  of	  information	  that	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  generalizations,	  then	  specific	  information	  that	  should	  modulate	  generalizations	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  information	  would	  not	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  play	  that	  role.	  When	  the	  generalizations	  (unlike	  the	  one	  about	  young	  drivers)	  are	  unjustified,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  many	  real-­‐world	  cases	  of	  bias	  in	  outgroup	  hiring,	  a	  poor	  epistemic	  situation	  will	  be	  perpetuated.	  	  	  This	  scenario	  gives	  us	  a	  model	  for	  formulating	  hypotheses	  about	  perception	  of	  other	  people.	  In	  the	  domain	  of	  social	  perception,	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  features	  that	  are	  congruent	  with	  antecedent	  social	  assumptions	  or	  with	  relative	  social	  positions	  are	  systematically	  selected	  for	  experience,	  whether	  incongruent	  features	  are	  systematically	  anti-­‐selected,	  or	  whether	  patterns	  of	  attention	  are	  entirely	  independent	  of	  relative	  social	  positions	  of	  the	  perceivers.	  If	  we	  suspect	  that	  social	  positions	  may	  be	  reflected	  in	  perceptual	  situations,	  this	  is	  a	  useful	  hypothesis	  to	  try	  and	  test.	  	  An	  application	  of	  these	  ideas	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  gaze-­‐following.	  Ingroup	  participants	  follow	  gaze	  more	  readily	  of	  ingroup	  members	  than	  outgroup	  members,	  whereas	  outgroup	  participants	  follow	  gaze	  of	  both	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  members.32	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  gaze-­‐following	  indicates	  confidence	  that	  the	  followed-­‐person’s	  object	  of	  attention	  or	  experience	  of	  it	  is	  epistemically	  valuable,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  hypothesize	  that	  this	  result	  reflects	  an	  underlying	  pattern	  of	  social	  valuation.	  This	  kind	  of	  selection	  effect	  shapes	  our	  epistemic	  situation.	  In	  general,	  selection	  effects	  that	  embody	  confirmation	  bias	  at	  the	  level	  of	  perception	  will	  be	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  farce.33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Adams	  and	  Kveraga	  (forthcoming).	  
33	  I	  discuss	  this	  kind	  of	  confirmation	  bias	  and	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  selection	  effects	  in	  Siegel	  (2013b). 
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The	  many	  modes	  of	  perceptual	  farce	  are	  useful	  for	  analyzing	  any	  domain	  that	  is	  ridden	  with	  resistance	  to	  taking	  in	  evidence	  that	  is	  available	  from	  perception.	  Payne’s	  experiment	  and	  others	  like	  it	  show	  that	  contemporary	  forms	  of	  racism	  are	  fueled	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  resistance.34	  And	  in	  philosophy,	  Iris	  Murdoch	  develops	  a	  systematic	  account	  of	  blindness	  to	  perceptually	  available	  facts.35	  Why,	  if	  people	  are	  presented	  with	  such	  specific	  information,	  does	  it	  not	  influence	  their	  decisions	  and	  their	  behavior?	  What	  role	  is	  the	  information	  playing,	  if	  it	  isn’t	  guiding	  belief	  and	  behavior?	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  people	  sometimes	  respond	  poorly	  to	  evidence	  when	  they	  deliberate.	  But	  when	  the	  new	  specific	  information	  comes	  from	  perception,	  some	  explanation	  is	  needed	  of	  why	  the	  information	  in	  these	  situations	  has	  so	  little	  impact	  on	  what	  subjects	  go	  on	  to	  believe	  or	  do,	  when	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  has	  so	  much	  impact.	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  distinction	  between	  cognitive	  penetration	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  perceptual	  farce	  is	  important	  for	  the	  psychology	  of	  perception,	  and	  for	  understanding	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  mind.	  But	  whether	  cognitive	  penetrability	  occurs	  or	  not	  is	  less	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  shaping	  and	  sustaining	  our	  outlook	  on	  the	  world,	  especially	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  social	  perception.	  Perceptual	  farce	  in	  the	  form	  of	  standard	  visual	  illusions	  has	  long	  fueled	  discussions	  in	  perceptual	  epistemology.	  When	  perceptual	  farce	  reflects	  social	  forces	  that	  would	  be	  better	  eradicated,	  or	  when	  it	  reflects	  moral	  limitations	  in	  other	  ways,	  it	  poses	  a	  host	  of	  normative	  questions	  about	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  judgments	  and	  perceptual	  behavior	  that	  they	  belong	  to.	  The	  epistemic	  questions	  surrounding	  putative	  cases	  of	  cognitive	  penetrability	  are	  just	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg.	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